

# How Does Caste Affect Entrepreneurship?

## Birth vs Worth

Sampreet S. Goraya  
Stockholm School of Economics

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# Introduction

- **Large misallocation** in developing countries. Banerjee & Duflo (2005), De Mel et al (2008) & HK (2009)
  - large  $sd(MRPK)$  and  $sd(MRPL)$ .
  - financial frictions, labor markets regulations, government policies.
- **This paper**: role of informal institutions in  $\uparrow$  resource misallocation;
  - **The caste system in India**  $\rightarrow$  segregation by birth not by ability  $\rightarrow$  distort economic outcome.
    - caste system  $\Rightarrow \uparrow$  **capital and talent misallocation**.
    - caste-dependent misallocation  $\Rightarrow \downarrow$  **TFP**.

# Main Results: Stylized Facts and Quantification

- Use MSME data with caste of enterprise owner (High (32%), Middle (39%) and Low castes (29%)).
- Do average revenue products vary across castes? **Yes!**
  1. LC & MC entrepreneurs  $\uparrow$  **Average Revenue Product of Capital** ( $ARPK = Y/K \propto MRPK$  under CD tech).
  2. Cross-caste difference in ARPK decreases over establishment size and age.
  3.  $\uparrow$  **Financial development** (FD)  $\rightarrow$  ARPK ( $\downarrow$ ), Capital-intensity ( $\uparrow$ ), Profitability ( $\downarrow$ ).
- Do LC & MC entrepreneurs face stricter borrowing constraints? **Yes!**
  1. Credit-to-output ratio ( $\downarrow$ )  $\Rightarrow$  **Higher degree of financial frictions** (38% ( $\uparrow$ ) for LC rel. to HC).
  2. Lowers the enterprise ownership for LC individuals.
- What macro-implications of equalizing access-to-credit across castes?
  1. ( $\downarrow$ ) capital and ( $\downarrow$ ) talent misallocation  $\Rightarrow$  (**5.6%  $\uparrow$  output per capita**).
  2. 55% gains comes from better allocation of talent (more entry of LC at the expense of HC firms).

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# Conceptual Framework

# Defining ARPK: Static Profit Maximization Problem

$$\max_{L_{isc}, K_{isc}} \left\{ P_{isc} \underbrace{z_{isc} (K_{isc}^{\alpha_s} L_{isc}^{1-\alpha_s})^{1-\nu}}_{Q_{isc}} - w L_{isc} - (1 + \tau_{sc}) R K_{isc} \right\}, \text{ where} \quad (1)$$

$$\text{MRPK}_{isc} := \alpha_s (1 - \nu) \underbrace{\left( \frac{P_{isc} Y_{isc}}{K_{isc}} \right)}_{\text{ARPK}} = (1 + \tau_{sc}) R,$$

$$\text{MRPL}_{isc} := (1 - \alpha_s) (1 - \nu) \underbrace{\left( \frac{P_{isc} Y_{isc}}{w L_{isc}} \right)}_{\text{ARPL}} = 1,$$

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$$\left( \frac{K}{L} \right)_{isc} := \left( \frac{\alpha_s}{1 - \alpha_s} \right) \left( \frac{1}{1 + \tau_{sc}} \right) \frac{w}{r}.$$



**Data**

# Data & Descriptive Statistics

**Table:** Summary Statistics: Manufacturing Sector & Population Shares

|                                                         | HC     |       | MC     |       | LC     |       | Overall |
|---------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|---------|
|                                                         | Total  | %     | Total  | %     | Total  | %     | Total   |
| <i>PANEL A.1: MSME 2006-2007 - Aggregate Statistics</i> |        |       |        |       |        |       |         |
| Observations (000s)                                     | 572    | 51%   | 438    | 39.1% | 109    | 9.8%  | 1121    |
| Enterprises (000s)                                      | 2915   | 39%   | 3504   | 46%   | 1144   | 15%   | 7563    |
|                                                         | Mean   | %     | Mean   | %     | Mean   | %     | Mean    |
| Employment                                              | 3.41   | 46.7% | 2.53   | 41.5% | 2.18   | 11.7% | 2.82    |
| Output                                                  | 285495 | 61.3% | 119040 | 30.7% | 95227  | 8.0%  | 179594  |
| Capital                                                 | 679811 | 70.3% | 195465 | 24.3% | 133282 | 5.4%  | 372573  |
| Credit                                                  | 27689  | 75.1% | 6158   | 20.1% | 4462   | 4.7%  | 14200   |

*PANEL D: IHDS*

|                        | HC    | MC    | LC    |
|------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Population Share       | 31.2% | 39.3% | 29.5% |
| Share of Entrepreneurs | 5.5%  | 4.6%  | 2.3%  |


# Stylized Facts

## Fact 1: ARPK is higher for Low-castes


$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 1_{L-CASTE} + \beta_2 1_{M-CASTE} + \Gamma_i + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

|              | (1)                | (2)               | (3)                | (4)                |
|--------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|              | All-Sector         |                   | Manufacturing      |                    |
|              | <i>arpk</i>        | <i>arpl</i>       | <i>arpk</i>        | <i>arpl</i>        |
| M-caste      | 0.14***<br>(0.02)  | -0.02*<br>(0.01)  | 0.13***<br>(0.02)  | -0.05***<br>(0.01) |
| L-caste      | 0.30***<br>(0.03)  | 0.02<br>(0.03)    | 0.25***<br>(0.02)  | -0.02<br>(0.02)    |
| Constant     | -0.66***<br>(0.01) | 0.56***<br>(0.01) | -0.69***<br>(0.01) | 0.60***<br>(0.01)  |
| Observations | 1,438,573          | 1,387,768         | 1,180,610          | 1,141,632          |
| R-squared    | 0.50               | 0.33              | 0.50               | 0.32               |
| District FE  | ✓                  | ✓                 | ✓                  | ✓                  |
| NIC4 FE      | ✓                  | ✓                 | ✓                  | ✓                  |

## Fact 2: ARPK differences decline over Size



(a) ARPK for Low Caste over Size



(b) ARPK for Middle Caste over Size

## Fact 3: ARPK differences decline with Regional Financial Development

|                     | ARPK              | ARPK               | K/L                | K/L                | Profit Rate       | Profit Rate        |
|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| M-caste             | 0.15***<br>(0.02) | 1.26***<br>(0.18)  | -0.26***<br>(0.02) | -1.23***<br>(0.16) | 0.03***<br>(0.01) | 0.75***<br>(0.13)  |
| L-caste             | 0.30***<br>(0.03) | 1.31***<br>(0.20)  | -0.53***<br>(0.04) | -1.40***<br>(0.17) | 0.08***<br>(0.02) | 0.70***<br>(0.15)  |
| FD                  |                   | 0.79***<br>(0.18)  |                    | -0.25*<br>(0.15)   |                   | 0.72***<br>(0.13)  |
| M-caste $\times$ FD |                   | -1.35***<br>(0.20) |                    | 1.02***<br>(0.19)  |                   | -0.85***<br>(0.15) |
| L-caste $\times$ FD |                   | -1.18***<br>(0.21) |                    | 0.88***<br>(0.20)  |                   | -0.71***<br>(0.15) |
| Observations        | 1,395,053         | 1,395,059          | 1,395,053          | 1,395,059          | 1,395,053         | 1,395,059          |
| R-squared           | 0.50              | 0.14               | 0.54               | 0.23               | 0.48              | 0.10               |
| District FE         | ✓                 | -                  | ✓                  | -                  | ✓                 | -                  |
| NIC4 FE             | ✓                 | ✓                  | ✓                  | ✓                  | ✓                 | ✓                  |

ARPK

Capita-labor ratio

Profits

Pop-LC1

Pop-LC2


# Quantitative Analysis

# Theoretical Framework: Timing

- 1 Good, Perfect Competition, GE in wages and interest rate (Buera, Kaboski & Shin 2011).
  - corporate sector: a representative firms,  $Y = K^{\theta_c} N^{1-\theta_c}$ 
    - unconstrained borrowing at  $r_t + \delta$
  - noncorporate sector: populated by entrepreneurs
    - Pay caste-specific  $\kappa_c$  access  $f(z, k, l) = z (k^\alpha l^\beta)^{1-\nu}$
    - size-based financial constraints
    - $(1 + r_t + \delta + d)k_t \leq \phi_r \lambda_s a_t; \quad a_t \geq 0$



# Theoretical Framework: Timing



# Calibration

# Calibrated Parameters and Matched Moments

| Fixed      | Value | Description                                 |
|------------|-------|---------------------------------------------|
| $\delta$   | 0.06  | Annual depreciation rate                    |
| $\alpha$   | 0.33  | Physical capital share: noncorporate sector |
| $\alpha_c$ | 0.33  | Physical capital share: corporate sector    |
| $\gamma$   | 1.50  | Coefficient of risk aversion                |
| $\kappa_c$ | 0.68  | Share of capital in corporate sector        |
| $d$        | 0.03  | Net interest rate margin                    |
| $P_{lc}$   | 0.29  | Population share: LC                        |
| $P_{mc}$   | 0.39  | Population share: MC                        |
| $P_{hc}$   | 0.36  | Population share: HC                        |

| Fitted         | Value | Description                   | Moments                      | Model         | Data  |
|----------------|-------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------|-------|
| $\lambda_{hc}$ | 4.20  | Financial frictions HC        | Overall Credit/output        | 0.45          | 0.44  |
| $\lambda_{mc}$ | 2.05  | Financial frictions MC        | Rel. Credit/output: MC       | 0.54          | 0.53  |
| $\lambda_{lc}$ | 1.86  | Financial frictions LC        | Rel. Credit/output: LC       | 0.46          | 0.48  |
| $\nu$          | 0.25  | Span of control               | Income distribution          | See Figure 2a |       |
| $\eta$         | 4.85  | Scale Parameter productivity  | Employment distribution      | See Figure 2b |       |
| $\rho$         | 0.92  | Discount rate                 | Annual Real Interest Rate    | 5.84%         | 5.7%  |
|                |       |                               | Capital-output ratio         | 2.10          | 2.04  |
| $\psi$         | 0.89  | Persistence in productivity   | Annual Enterprise Exit rate  | 10.1%         | 8.8%  |
| $\kappa_{hc}$  | 0.40  | Fixed cost of operating-HC    | Share of enterprise owned-HC | 37.9%         | 36.5% |
| $\kappa_{mc}$  | 0.30  | Fixed cost of operating-MC    | Share of enterprise owned-MC | 46.1%         | 47.5% |
| $\kappa_{lc}$  | 0.67  | Fixed cost of operating-LC    | Share of enterprise owned-LC | 16.0%         | 16.0% |
| $\bar{K}$      | 87.1  | Capital threshold MSME sector | Share of MSME sector         | 0.72          | 0.70  |

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| $\nu$          | 0.25  | Span of control               | Income distribution          | See Figure 2a |       |
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| $\bar{K}$      | 87.1  | Capital threshold MSME sector | Share of MSME sector         | 0.72          | 0.70  |

# Model Assessment on Nontargeted Moments

|                                                             | Model  | Data      |                      | Model | Data |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-----------|----------------------|-------|------|
| <b>Panel A.1: ARPK, Capital Intensity and Profitability</b> |        |           |                      |       |      |
| log(ARPK)-MC                                                | +17.7% | +13%(22%) | $sd(\log(ARPK))$ -HC | 0.44  | 1.36 |
| log(ARPK)-LC                                                | +31.6% | +25%(30%) | $sd(\log(ARPK))$ -MC | 0.54  | 1.22 |
| log(K/L)-MC                                                 | -17.7% | -26%(27%) | $sd(\log(ARPK))$ -LC | 0.64  | 1.22 |
| log(K/L)-LC                                                 | -31.6% | -49%(45%) |                      |       |      |
| Profitability-MC                                            | +10.4% | +2%(10%)  |                      |       |      |
| Profitability-LC                                            | +6.0%  | +5%(14%)  |                      |       |      |
| <b>Panel A.2: ARPK over Firm Size for LC Enterprises</b>    |        |           |                      |       |      |
| Small Enterprises: Lowest Decile                            | +55%   | +52%      |                      |       |      |
| Large Enterprises: Top Decile                               | +15%   | +12%      |                      |       |      |

# Regional Financial Development and ARPK Differences

|                         | Model          |              |              |              |              | Data          |               |              |
|-------------------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|
| Financial Development   | Lowest         | Benchmark    |              |              | Highest      | Low           | Medium        | High         |
| Regions                 | (i)            | (ii)         | (iii)        | (iv)         | (v)          | (a)           | (b)           | (c)          |
| Intermediation cost     | $d = 0$        | $d = 0.03$   | $d = 0$      | $d = 0$      | $d = 0$      |               |               |              |
| Regional credit shifter | $\phi_r = 0.6$ | $\phi_r = 1$ | $\phi_r = 1$ | $\phi_r = 2$ | $\phi_r = 3$ |               |               |              |
| Credit-output ratio     | 0.33           | 0.45         | 0.60         | 0.82         | 0.90         | 0.28          | 0.62          | 1.21         |
| log(ARPK)-MC            | +34.2%         | +17.1%       | +19.4%       | +14.4%       | +9.1%        | +19.1%(30.8%) | +9.7%(10.1%)  | +8.5%(9.7%)  |
| log(ARPK)-LC            | +45.0%         | +30.1%       | +33.1%       | +21.4%       | +13.6%       | +30.3%(45.8%) | +22.8%(14.5%) | +11.5%(9.3%) |

# Equalizing Access To Credit Across Castes

A comparison of Benchmark (BM) and Counterfactual Economy (CF)

|                              | BM           | CF    | Change   |           |      |           |
|------------------------------|--------------|-------|----------|-----------|------|-----------|
| Panel A. Overall Economy     |              |       |          |           |      |           |
| Output per capita            | 1.43         | 1.51  | +5.6%    |           |      |           |
| Capital Intensity            | 3.14         | 3.29  | +4.7%    |           |      |           |
| Interest Rate                | 5.86%        | 6.35% | 0.5 p.p. |           |      |           |
| Panel B. Noncorporate Sector |              |       |          |           |      |           |
| Output per worker            | 1.76         | 1.86  | +5.7%    |           |      |           |
| $\sigma(arpk)$               | 0.54         | 0.41  | -24.1%   |           |      |           |
| Capital Intensity            | 2.41         | 2.63  | +9.1%    |           |      |           |
| Credit/Output                | 0.46         | 0.60  | +30.4%   |           |      |           |
| Panel C. Caste-Level         |              |       |          |           |      |           |
|                              | Middle-Caste |       |          | Low-Caste |      |           |
|                              | BM           | CF    | Change   | BM        | CF   | Change    |
| Capital Intensity            | 2.34         | 2.64  | 12.8%    | 2.28      | 2.64 | 15.8%     |
| Output per worker            | 1.76         | 1.86  | +5.7%    | 1.76      | 1.86 | +5.7%     |
| Enterprise Ownership         | 46%          | 46%   | +0 p.p.  | 16%       | 22%  | +6.0 p.p. |
| Credit/Output                | 0.35         | 0.60  | 71%      | 0.29      | 0.58 | 100%      |
| $\sigma(arpk)$               | 0.54         | 0.41  | -24.0%   | 0.64      | 0.45 | -29.7%    |

# Income and Wealth Inequality

Table: Income and Wealth Inequality across Castes

|    | Income |      | Wealth |      | Counterfactual Gains |        |
|----|--------|------|--------|------|----------------------|--------|
|    | Model  | Data | Model  | Data | Income               | Wealth |
| HC | 1.00   | 1.00 | 1.00   | 1.00 | 1.6%                 | -5.9%  |
| MC | 0.97   | 0.76 | 0.92   | 0.53 | 6.6%                 | 6.5%   |
| LC | 0.91   | 0.51 | 0.74   | 0.28 | 8.8%                 | 16.4%  |



# What Do We learn

- Caste-specific distortions  $\implies$  important for  $\downarrow$  manufacturing TFP  $+$   $\uparrow$  misallocation.
- Future Research:
  - What about long-run growth?
  - Direct evidence & sources of discrimination in credit markets?
  - What about labor, intermediate inputs and product markets?
- Immense opportunities with better data  $+$  Macro Machinery.

# Appendix

# Fact 1: ARPK is higher for Low-castes

Table: ARPK across castes

| VARIABLES               | (1)<br><i>arpk</i> | (2)<br><i>arpk</i> | (3)<br><i>arpk</i> |
|-------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| M-Caste                 | 0.14***<br>(0.02)  | 0.13***<br>(0.02)  | 0.09***<br>(0.02)  |
| L-Caste                 | 0.30***<br>(0.03)  | 0.26***<br>(0.03)  | 0.24***<br>(0.04)  |
| Wage                    |                    |                    | 0.00<br>(0.02)     |
| log(Years of Schooling) |                    |                    | -0.07***<br>(0.02) |
| log(Land Holdings)      |                    |                    | 0.01<br>(0.01)     |
| Sd(Output-Growth)       |                    |                    | -0.24***<br>(0.08) |
| Constant                | -0.66***<br>(0.01) | -0.66***<br>(0.01) | -0.54**<br>(0.24)  |
| Observations            | 1,438,571          | 1,438,536          | 1,170,012          |
| R-squared               | 0.50               | 0.51               | 0.52               |
| District FE             | ✓                  | ✓                  | ✓                  |
| NIC4 FE                 | ✓                  |                    |                    |
| NIC5 FE                 |                    | ✓                  | ✓                  |

## Fact 1: ARPK is higher for Low-castes

Table: ARPK across castes

|              | (1)                | (2)               | (3)                | (4)               |
|--------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
|              | All-Sector         |                   | Manufacturing      |                   |
|              | <i>arpk</i>        | <i>arpl</i>       | <i>arpk</i>        | <i>arpl</i>       |
| M-Caste      | 0.17***<br>(0.03)  | 0.09***<br>(0.02) | 0.22***<br>(0.04)  | 0.09***<br>(0.03) |
| L-caste      | 0.25***<br>(0.06)  | 0.16***<br>(0.04) | 0.30***<br>(0.05)  | 0.14***<br>(0.05) |
| Constant     | -0.09***<br>(0.02) | 0.65***<br>(0.02) | -0.18***<br>(0.02) | 0.58***<br>(0.02) |
| Observations | 1,438,546          | 1,387,741         | 1,180,585          | 1,141,607         |
| R-squared    | 0.38               | 0.42              | 0.38               | 0.35              |
| District FE  | ✓                  | ✓                 | ✓                  | ✓                 |
| NIC4 FE      | ✓                  | ✓                 | ✓                  | ✓                 |

# Fact 1: ARPK is higher for Low-castes

Table: ARPK across castes

|              | All sectors        |                    | Manufacturing      |                    |
|--------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Dep. Var.    | (1)<br><i>arpk</i> | (2)<br><i>arpk</i> | (3)<br><i>arpk</i> | (4)<br><i>arpk</i> |
| MC           | 0.07**<br>(0.04)   | 0.07*<br>(0.04)    | 0.12**<br>(0.05)   | 0.11**<br>(0.05)   |
| LC           | 0.15**<br>(0.07)   | 0.13*<br>(0.07)    | 0.20***<br>(0.06)  | 0.19***<br>(0.06)  |
| $\mu$        |                    | 0.08***<br>(0.03)  |                    | 0.04<br>(0.03)     |
| Constant     | 0.45***<br>(0.03)  | 0.42***<br>(0.03)  | 0.47***<br>(0.03)  | 0.45***<br>(0.03)  |
| Observations | 1,438,552          | 1,438,542          | 1,145,267          | 1,145,267          |
| R-squared    | 0.15               | 0.16               | 0.17               | 0.17               |
| District FE  | ✓                  | ✓                  | ✓                  | ✓                  |
| NIC4 FE      | ✓                  | ✓                  | ✓                  | ✓                  |

# Fact 1: ARPK is higher for Low-castes

Table: ARPK across castes

|                 | All sectors       |                   |                    | Manufacturing     |                   |                    |
|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Dep. Var.       | <i>arpk</i>       | <i>arpk</i>       | <i>arpk</i>        | <i>arpk</i>       | <i>arpk</i>       | <i>arpk</i>        |
| MC              | 0.10***<br>(0.03) | 0.10***<br>(0.03) | 0.07**<br>(0.03)   | 0.12***<br>(0.03) | 0.12***<br>(0.03) | 0.09**<br>(0.03)   |
| LC              | 0.17***<br>(0.05) | 0.17***<br>(0.05) | 0.21***<br>(0.05)  | 0.19***<br>(0.04) | 0.20***<br>(0.04) | 0.21***<br>(0.04)  |
| $\mu$           |                   | 0.00<br>(0.02)    | 0.00<br>(0.02)     |                   | -0.03<br>(0.03)   | -0.03<br>(0.03)    |
| $\theta_{sc}^k$ |                   |                   | -2.33***<br>(0.54) |                   |                   | -3.32***<br>(0.69) |
| Constant        | 0.44***<br>(0.02) | 0.44***<br>(0.02) | 0.72***<br>(0.07)  | 0.47***<br>(0.02) | 0.48***<br>(0.02) | 0.84***<br>(0.08)  |
| Observations    | 1,438,546         | 1,438,536         | 1,438,536          | 1,145,261         | 1,145,261         | 1,145,261          |
| R-squared       | 0.37              | 0.37              | 0.37               | 0.36              | 0.36              | 0.36               |
| District FE     | ✓                 | ✓                 | ✓                  | ✓                 | ✓                 | ✓                  |
| NIC4 FE         | ✓                 | ✓                 | ✓                  | ✓                 | ✓                 | ✓                  |

# Sectoral Shares of Output across Castes

| Sector                                                           | NIC | LC Share | MC Share | HC Share | Sector Share |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----------|----------|----------|--------------|
| Manufacture of food products and beverages                       | 15  | 0.016    | 0.054    | 0.106    | 0.090        |
| Manufacture of wearing apparel                                   | 18  | 0.013    | 0.049    | 0.052    | 0.035        |
| Manufacture of tobacco products                                  | 17  | 0.009    | 0.040    | 0.079    | 0.081        |
| Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.                   | 36  | 0.008    | 0.035    | 0.036    | 0.036        |
| Manufacture of fabricated metal products                         | 28  | 0.006    | 0.027    | 0.057    | 0.038        |
| Manufacture of wood and of products of wood                      | 20  | 0.006    | 0.014    | 0.017    | 0.015        |
| Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products               | 26  | 0.003    | 0.017    | 0.043    | 0.051        |
| Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.                    | 29  | 0.003    | 0.014    | 0.044    | 0.057        |
| Tanning and dressing of leather                                  | 19  | 0.002    | 0.003    | 0.008    | 0.008        |
| Manufacture of rubber and plastics products                      | 25  | 0.002    | 0.006    | 0.024    | 0.024        |
| Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products                   | 24  | 0.002    | 0.009    | 0.037    | 0.133        |
| Manufacture of basic metals                                      | 27  | 0.002    | 0.006    | 0.028    | 0.113        |
| Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media          | 22  | 0.002    | 0.008    | 0.014    | 0.017        |
| Manufacture of tobacco products                                  | 16  | 0.001    | 0.004    | 0.007    | 0.020        |
| Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.         | 31  | 0.001    | 0.007    | 0.017    | 0.035        |
| Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment     | 32  | 0.001    | 0.002    | 0.004    | 0.015        |
| Manufacture of other transport equipment                         | 35  | 0.001    | 0.003    | 0.011    | 0.025        |
| Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments        | 33  | 0.001    | 0.003    | 0.007    | 0.008        |
| Manufacture of paper and paper products                          | 21  | 0.000    | 0.003    | 0.012    | 0.014        |
| Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers        | 34  | 0.000    | 0.002    | 0.005    | 0.064        |
| Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel | 23  | 0.000    | 0.001    | 0.002    | 0.115        |
| Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery        | 30  | 0.000    | 0.000    | 0.002    | 0.007        |
| Recycling                                                        | 37  | 0.000    | 0.000    | 0.000    | 0.000        |
| Total                                                            |     | 0.080    | 0.307    | 0.613    | 1.000        |

# Fact 3a: Regional Financial Development and ARPK

| VARIABLES                                                  | (1)<br>log(ARPK)  | (2)<br>log(ARPK)   | (3)<br>log(ARPK)     | (4)<br>log(ARPK)    | (5)<br>log(ARPK)   | (6)<br>log(ARPK)    |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| M-Caste                                                    | 0.13***<br>(0.02) | 1.33***<br>(0.21)  | 1.71***<br>(0.30)    | 1.71***<br>(0.33)   | 0.65***<br>(0.25)  | 2.11***<br>(0.28)   |
| L-Caste                                                    | 0.25***<br>(0.03) | 0.95***<br>(0.22)  | 1.81***<br>(0.30)    | 1.06***<br>(0.32)   | 1.05***<br>(0.24)  | 1.77***<br>(0.29)   |
| Commercial banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )                  |                   | -3.28**<br>(1.33)  |                      |                     |                    |                     |
| M-Caste $\times$ Commercial banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ ) |                   | -8.33***<br>(1.75) |                      |                     |                    |                     |
| L-Caste $\times$ Commercial banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ ) |                   | -2.07<br>(1.97)    |                      |                     |                    |                     |
| Rural banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )                       |                   |                    | 121.49***<br>(14.27) |                     |                    |                     |
| M-Caste $\times$ Rural banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )      |                   |                    | -81.15***<br>(16.14) |                     |                    |                     |
| L-Caste $\times$ Rural banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )      |                   |                    | -86.87***<br>(15.76) |                     |                    |                     |
| All Banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )                         |                   |                    |                      | 2.14<br>(1.94)      |                    |                     |
| M-Caste $\times$ All banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )        |                   |                    |                      | -11.36***<br>(2.53) |                    |                     |
| L-Caste $\times$ All banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )        |                   |                    |                      | -2.80<br>(2.41)     |                    |                     |
| % of HH with Bank account                                  |                   |                    |                      |                     | -1.00***<br>(0.37) |                     |
| M-Caste $\times$ % of HH with Bank account                 |                   |                    |                      |                     | -0.21<br>(0.64)    |                     |
| L-Caste $\times$ % of HH with Bank account                 |                   |                    |                      |                     | -1.01*<br>(0.58)   |                     |
| % of HH with loan                                          |                   |                    |                      |                     |                    | 8.58***<br>(1.57)   |
| M-Caste $\times$ % of HH with loan                         |                   |                    |                      |                     |                    | -12.20***<br>(1.69) |
| L-Caste $\times$ % of HH with loan                         |                   |                    |                      |                     |                    | -8.48***<br>(1.70)  |
| Observations                                               | 1,119,508         | 1,119,514          | 1,114,209            | 1,114,209           | 1,119,514          | 1,119,514           |
| R-squared                                                  | 0.51              | 0.13               | 0.22                 | 0.13                | 0.12               | 0.16                |
| District FE                                                | Yes               | No                 | No                   | No                  | No                 | No                  |
| NIC4 FE                                                    | Yes               | Yes                | Yes                  | Yes                 | Yes                | Yes                 |



# Fact 3b: Regional Financial Development and Capital-labor ratio

| VARIABLES                                                  | (1)<br>log(K/L)    | (2)<br>log(K/L)    | (3)<br>log(K/L)       | (4)<br>log(K/L)    | (5)<br>log(K/L)    | (6)<br>log(K/L)    |
|------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| M-Caste                                                    | -0.26***<br>(0.02) | -1.51***<br>(0.20) | -1.64***<br>(0.24)    | -1.81***<br>(0.30) | -0.74***<br>(0.23) | -2.23***<br>(0.24) |
| L-Caste                                                    | -0.49***<br>(0.03) | -1.13***<br>(0.21) | -1.92***<br>(0.25)    | -1.15***<br>(0.29) | -1.36***<br>(0.23) | -1.76***<br>(0.24) |
| Commercial banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )                  |                    | 5.37***<br>(1.35)  |                       |                    |                    |                    |
| M-Caste $\times$ Commercial banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ ) |                    | 8.93***<br>(1.85)  |                       |                    |                    |                    |
| L-Caste $\times$ Commercial banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ ) |                    | 1.46<br>(2.07)     |                       |                    |                    |                    |
| Rural banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )                       |                    |                    | -112.77***<br>(11.45) |                    |                    |                    |
| M-Caste $\times$ Rural banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )      |                    |                    | 65.72***<br>(13.66)   |                    |                    |                    |
| L-Caste $\times$ Rural banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )      |                    |                    | 77.62***<br>(13.31)   |                    |                    |                    |
| All banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )                         |                    |                    |                       | 0.39<br>(1.89)     |                    |                    |
| M-Caste $\times$ All banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )        |                    |                    |                       | 11.09***<br>(2.55) |                    |                    |
| L-Caste $\times$ All banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )        |                    |                    |                       | 1.35<br>(2.37)     |                    |                    |
| % of HH with Bank account                                  |                    |                    |                       |                    | 1.75***<br>(0.31)  |                    |
| M-Caste $\times$ % of HH with Bank account                 |                    |                    |                       |                    | 0.20<br>(0.65)     |                    |
| L-Caste $\times$ % of HH with Bank account                 |                    |                    |                       |                    | 1.36**<br>(0.59)   |                    |
| % of HH with loan                                          |                    |                    |                       |                    |                    | -7.39***<br>(1.27) |
| M-Caste $\times$ % of HH with loan                         |                    |                    |                       |                    |                    | 11.86***<br>(1.49) |
| L-Caste $\times$ % of HH with loan                         |                    |                    |                       |                    |                    | 6.43***<br>(1.46)  |
| Observations                                               | 1,119,508          | 1,119,514          | 1,114,209             | 1,114,209          | 1,119,514          | 1,119,514          |
| R-squared                                                  | 0.55               | 0.24               | 0.31                  | 0.23               | 0.24               | 0.26               |
| District FE                                                | Yes                | No                 | No                    | No                 | No                 | No                 |
| NIC4 FE                                                    | Yes                | Yes                | Yes                   | Yes                | Yes                | Yes                |

## Fact 3c: Regional Financial Development and Profit Rate

| VARIABLES                                                  | (1)               | (2)                | (3)                  | (4)                | (5)               | (6)                |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
|                                                            | Profit Rate       | Profit Rate        | Profit Rate          | Profit Rate        | Profit Rate       | Profit Rate        |
| M-Caste                                                    | 0.02**<br>(0.01)  | 0.62***<br>(0.15)  | 1.00***<br>(0.22)    | 0.88***<br>(0.23)  | 0.35**<br>(0.16)  | 1.16***<br>(0.20)  |
| L-Caste                                                    | 0.05***<br>(0.02) | 0.44***<br>(0.15)  | 1.08***<br>(0.22)    | 0.63***<br>(0.21)  | 0.49***<br>(0.15) | 1.00***<br>(0.20)  |
| Commercial banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )                  |                   | -0.66<br>(0.90)    |                      |                    |                   |                    |
| M-Caste $\times$ Commercial banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ ) |                   | -3.51***<br>(1.20) |                      |                    |                   |                    |
| L-Caste $\times$ Commercial banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ ) |                   | -0.95<br>(1.24)    |                      |                    |                   |                    |
| Rural banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )                       |                   |                    | 74.66***<br>(10.50)  |                    |                   |                    |
| M-Caste $\times$ Rural banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )      |                   |                    | -50.72***<br>(11.65) |                    |                   |                    |
| L-Caste $\times$ Rural banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )      |                   |                    | -59.25***<br>(11.54) |                    |                   |                    |
| All banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )                         |                   |                    |                      | 3.20**<br>(1.32)   |                   |                    |
| M-Caste $\times$ All banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )        |                   |                    |                      | -5.84***<br>(1.71) |                   |                    |
| L-Caste $\times$ All banks per capita ( $10^{-3}$ )        |                   |                    |                      | -2.80*<br>(1.52)   |                   |                    |
| % of HH with Bank account                                  |                   |                    |                      |                    | -0.34<br>(0.25)   |                    |
| M-Caste $\times$ % of HH with Bank account                 |                   |                    |                      |                    | -0.12<br>(0.38)   |                    |
| L-Caste $\times$ % of HH with Bank account                 |                   |                    |                      |                    | -0.49<br>(0.35)   |                    |
| % of HH with loan                                          |                   |                    |                      |                    |                   | 6.55***<br>(1.11)  |
| M-Caste $\times$ % of HH with loan                         |                   |                    |                      |                    |                   | -7.25***<br>(1.16) |
| L-Caste $\times$ % of HH with loan                         |                   |                    |                      |                    |                   | -5.57***<br>(1.13) |
| Observations                                               | 1,119,508         | 1,119,514          | 1,114,209            | 1,114,209          | 1,119,514         | 1,119,514          |
| R-squared                                                  | 0.46              | 0.08               | 0.15                 | 0.08               | 0.08              | 0.12               |
| District FE                                                | Yes               | No                 | No                   | No                 | No                | No                 |
| NIC4 FE                                                    | Yes               | Yes                | Yes                  | Yes                | Yes               | Yes                |

# Population Share across castes

| Region             | Population Share |       |       |         |
|--------------------|------------------|-------|-------|---------|
|                    | LC               | MC    | HC    | Overall |
| Uttar Pradesh      | 0.237            | 0.535 | 0.228 | 0.156   |
| Maharashtra        | 0.257            | 0.336 | 0.407 | 0.090   |
| West Bengal        | 0.404            | 0.094 | 0.501 | 0.075   |
| Bihar              | 0.228            | 0.592 | 0.180 | 0.073   |
| Andhra Pradesh     | 0.286            | 0.544 | 0.170 | 0.071   |
| Tamil Nadu         | 0.310            | 0.623 | 0.068 | 0.057   |
| Rajasthan          | 0.300            | 0.493 | 0.206 | 0.057   |
| Madhya Pradesh     | 0.340            | 0.447 | 0.213 | 0.053   |
| Karnataka          | 0.278            | 0.504 | 0.218 | 0.052   |
| Gujarat            | 0.230            | 0.457 | 0.312 | 0.049   |
| Jharkhand          | 0.448            | 0.351 | 0.202 | 0.039   |
| Orissa             | 0.385            | 0.437 | 0.178 | 0.035   |
| Chhatisgarh        | 0.410            | 0.487 | 0.104 | 0.029   |
| Kerala             | 0.105            | 0.568 | 0.327 | 0.028   |
| Assam              | 0.369            | 0.106 | 0.525 | 0.025   |
| Punjab             | 0.391            | 0.225 | 0.383 | 0.022   |
| Haryana            | 0.278            | 0.357 | 0.365 | 0.019   |
| Delhi              | 0.321            | 0.300 | 0.379 | 0.017   |
| Uttaranchal        | 0.409            | 0.249 | 0.342 | 0.016   |
| Jammu & Kashmir    | 0.115            | 0.157 | 0.728 | 0.012   |
| Himachal Pradesh   | 0.326            | 0.089 | 0.585 | 0.006   |
| Tripura            | 0.460            | 0.211 | 0.329 | 0.003   |
| Goa                | 0.138            | 0.310 | 0.552 | 0.003   |
| Meghalaya          | 0.845            | 0     | 0.155 | 0.002   |
| Manipur            | 0                | 0.063 | 0.937 | 0.002   |
| Nagaland           | 0.883            | 0     | 0.117 | 0.002   |
| Pondicherry        | 0.041            | 0.923 | 0.035 | 0.002   |
| Chandigarh         | 0.134            | 0.254 | 0.612 | 0.001   |
| Arunachal Pradesh  | 0.911            | 0.028 | 0.061 | 0.001   |
| Dadra+Nagar Haveli | 0.388            | 0.245 | 0.367 | 0.001   |
| Sikkim             | 0.225            | 0.414 | 0.361 | 0.001   |
| Daman & Diu        | 0.434            | 0.470 | 0.096 | 0.000   |

# Population Share across castes

**Table:** Regional Financial Development and Capital Allocation

|                       | (1)                | (2)                | (3)                | (4)                | (5)                | (6)                | (7)                | (8)                | (9)                | (10)               | (11)               | (12)               |
|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|                       |                    |                    | Full Sample        |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    | Restrcted Sample   |                    |                    |                    |
|                       | log(ARPK)          | log(ARPK)          | log(K/L)           | log(K/L)           | Profit Rate        | Profit Rate        | log(ARPK)          | log(ARPK)          | log(K/L)           | log(K/L)           | Profit Rate        | Profit Rate        |
| M-Caste               | 0.14***<br>(0.02)  | 1.35***<br>(0.21)  | -0.30***<br>(0.02) | -1.41***<br>(0.19) | 0.03***<br>(0.01)  | 0.77***<br>(0.15)  | 0.18***<br>(0.03)  | 2.14***<br>(0.29)  | -0.35***<br>(0.03) | -2.16***<br>(0.24) | 0.06***<br>(0.02)  | 1.26***<br>(0.20)  |
| L-Caste               | 0.25***<br>(0.03)  | 1.37***<br>(0.22)  | -0.49***<br>(0.03) | -1.52***<br>(0.19) | 0.05***<br>(0.02)  | 0.72***<br>(0.16)  | 0.28***<br>(0.03)  | 1.55***<br>(0.28)  | -0.51***<br>(0.04) | -1.70***<br>(0.24) | 0.07***<br>(0.02)  | 0.82***<br>(0.19)  |
| $FD_s$                |                    | 0.83***<br>(0.20)  |                    | -0.31*<br>(0.17)   |                    | 0.71***<br>(0.14)  |                    | 1.16***<br>(0.22)  |                    | -0.59***<br>(0.18) |                    | 0.92***<br>(0.15)  |
| M-Caste $\times FD_s$ |                    | -1.36***<br>(0.23) |                    | 1.05***<br>(0.21)  |                    | -0.80***<br>(0.15) |                    | -1.69***<br>(0.24) |                    | 1.42***<br>(0.22)  |                    | -0.97***<br>(0.16) |
| L-Caste $\times FD_s$ |                    | -1.26***<br>(0.24) |                    | 1.05***<br>(0.23)  |                    | -0.76***<br>(0.16) |                    | -1.35***<br>(0.30) |                    | 1.17***<br>(0.27)  |                    | -0.79***<br>(0.20) |
| Population Share      | -0.04<br>(0.05)    | -0.37**<br>(0.17)  | 0.18**<br>(0.07)   | 0.64***<br>(0.17)  | -0.05**<br>(0.02)  | -0.33***<br>(0.11) | -0.13*<br>(0.07)   | -1.91***<br>(0.35) | 0.29***<br>(0.10)  | 1.95***<br>(0.33)  | -0.12***<br>(0.04) | -1.36***<br>(0.23) |
| Constant              | -0.66***<br>(0.02) | -1.19***<br>(0.19) | 11.32***<br>(0.03) | 11.57***<br>(0.16) | -0.04***<br>(0.01) | -0.43***<br>(0.13) | -0.72***<br>(0.02) | -1.10***<br>(0.19) | 11.36***<br>(0.03) | 11.50***<br>(0.16) | -0.07***<br>(0.01) | -0.36***<br>(0.13) |
| Observations          | 1,118,427          | 1,118,433          | 1,118,427          | 1,118,433          | 1,118,427          | 1,118,433          | 897,456            | 897,458            | 897,456            | 897,458            | 897,456            | 897,458            |
| R-squared             | 0.51               | 0.13               | 0.55               | 0.23               | 0.46               | 0.09               | 0.55               | 0.19               | 0.59               | 0.29               | 0.50               | 0.14               |
| District FE           | Yes                | No                 | Yes                | No                 | Yes                | No                 | Yes                | No                 | Yes                | No                 | Yes                | No                 |
| NIC4 FE               | Yes                | Yes                | Yes                | Yes                | Yes                | Yes                | Yes                | Yes                | Yes                | Yes                | Yes                | Yes                |

# Model

- Preferences,

$$\mathbb{E} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \rho^t \frac{C_t^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma}.$$

- Occupation choice of the household.

$$V(a, z, s) = \max\{V^w(a, z, s), V^e(a, z, s)\}. \quad (3)$$

The workers' value function is given by

$$\begin{aligned} V^w(a, z, s) = \max_{c, a' \geq 0} & u(c) + \rho \{ \psi V(a', z, s) + (1 - \psi) \int_{z'} V(a', z', s) dY(z'|s) \} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & c + a' \leq w + (1 + r)a. \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

The entrepreneurs' value function is given by

$$\begin{aligned} V^e(a, z, s) = \max_{c, k, l, a' \geq 0} & u(c) + \rho \{ \psi V(a', z, s) + (1 - \psi) \int_{z'} V(a', z', s) dY(z'|s) \} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & c + a' \leq z (k^\alpha l^\beta)^{1-\nu} - wl - (r + \delta + d)k - \kappa_s + (1 + r)a \\ & (1 + r + \delta + d)k \leq \phi \lambda_s a. \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

# Model

- Preferences,

$$\mathbb{E} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \rho^t \frac{C_t^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma}.$$

- Occupation choice of the household.

$$V(a, z, s) = \max\{V^w(a, z, s), V^e(a, z, s)\}. \quad (3)$$

The workers' value function is given by

$$\begin{aligned} V^w(a, z, s) &= \max_{c, a' \geq 0} u(c) + \rho \{ \psi V(a', z, s) + (1 - \psi) \int_{z'} V(a', z', s) dY(z'|s) \} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad &c + a' \leq w + (1 + r)a. \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

The entrepreneurs' value function is given by

$$\begin{aligned} V^e(a, z, s) &= \max_{c, k, l, a' \geq 0} u(c) + \rho \{ \psi V(a', z, s) + (1 - \psi) \int_{z'} V(a', z', s) dY(z'|s) \} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad &c + a' \leq z (k^\alpha l^\beta)^{1-\nu} - wl - (r + \delta + d)k - \kappa_s + (1 + r)a \\ &(1 + r + \delta + d)k \leq \phi \lambda_s a. \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

# Recursive Competitive Equilibrium

- *Equilibrium*: At time 0, given the distribution  $\Lambda_0(a, z, c)$ , the equilibrium of the economy is characterized by a sequence of allocations  $\{o_t, C_t, a_{t+1}, k_t, l_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ , factor prices  $\{w_t, r_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ , and  $\Lambda_t(a, z, c)_{t=1}^{\infty}$  such that
  1.  $\{o_t, C_t, a_{t+1}, k_t, l_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  solves the individuals' policy functions for given factor prices  $\{w_t, r_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ .
  2. The capital, labor, and goods markets clear in each period

$$\int_{o_t(a,z,s)=e} k_t d\Lambda_t(a, z, s) + K_c - \int a_t d\Lambda_t(a, z, s) = 0,$$

$$\int_{o_t(a,z,s)=e} l_t d\Lambda_t(a, z, s) + N_c - \int_{o_t(a,z,s)=w} d\Lambda_t(a, z, s) = 0,$$

$$\int_{o_t(a,z,s)=e} [z_t (k_t^\alpha l_t^\beta)^{1-\nu} - \kappa_s] d\Lambda_t(a, z, s) + K_c^{\theta_c} N_c^{1-\theta_c} = \int c_t d\Lambda_t(a, z, s) + (\delta + d)K + \delta K_c;$$

3. The joint distribution of productivity and assets for each caste  $\Lambda_t(a, z, s)_{t=1}^{\infty}$  evolve according to the equilibrium mapping

$$\Lambda_{t+1}(a, z, s) = \psi \int_{\{z, a_{t+1}(a,z,s) < a\}} \Lambda_t(da, dz, s) + (1 - \psi) \int_{\{z' \leq z, a'(a,z,s) \leq a\}} \Lambda_t(da, dz, s) dY_t(z'|s).$$

# Marginal Revenue Product of Capital

- The consumption Euler equation for constrained entrepreneurs is given by,

$$C_t^{-\gamma} = \rho \int_{z'} \{C_{t+1}^{-\gamma} (1 + r_{t+1} + \lambda_c \Theta_{t+1})\} d\Lambda(z'|z),$$

- where  $\Theta_{t+1}$  is defined as,


$$\Theta_{t+1} = \max[f_k(\lambda_c a_{t+1}, z_{t+1}) - (r_{t+1} + \delta), 0].$$

- where  $f_k(\lambda_c a_{t+1}, z_{t+1})$  is *mrpk* and  $r_{t+1} + \delta$  is the marginal cost of capital.
- and  $mrpk = \alpha(1 - v)arpk$




# Employment & Household Income Distributions Main


(a) Employment Share Distribution



(b) Household Income Distribution



(c) Cohort Employment Distribution



(d) The Survival of Cohorts

